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Bridging the Constitutional Gap in EU Executive Rule-making  
The Court of Justice Approves Legislative Conferral of Intervention Powers to European 
Securities Markets Authority – Judgment of 22 January 2014, Case C-270/12, UK v. 
Parliament and Council (Grand Chamber) 
Heikki Marjosola 
INTRODUCTION 
This case note analyses the judgement of 22 January 2014 of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (Grand Chamber) in the Case C-270/12 UK v. Parliament and Council 
(Short selling).1 In this closely watched case the United Kingdom challenged the 
empowerment of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) under Article 28 of 
Regulation 236/2012 on Short Selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps on various 
grounds (henceforth: the Short Selling Regulation).2 The action forms a part of a series of 
measures brought by the UK in its attempt to protect the City of London from the increasingly 
interventionist forms of EU financial regulation.3 The UK’s activism has not been without 
results, and after the Advocate General, in his opinion delivered on September 12, 2013 sided 
with the UK in the crucial question of the appropriate Treaty basis of the challenged powers, 
the odds again seemed to be in favour of the UK.4 The Court nevertheless dismissed the 
action in its entirety. 
The Court’s ruling eases constitutional tensions overshadowing the on-going reorganisation 
and vertical consolidation of financial supervisory powers in the EU. But the Court’s findings 
are important more generally in the context of the Union’s agencification, that is 
                                                     
1
 ECJ 22 January 2014 , Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber). 
2
 Regulation 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects 
of credit default swaps, O.J. L 86/1 (Short Selling Regulation). 
3
 For early criticism, see Financial Services Authority, Working towards effective and confident European Supervisory 
Authorities: The FSA’s views on policy considerations, December 2010, at p. 11: ‘It is therefore necessary that any 
proposed emergency decision is checked to ensure that it is not ultra vires or otherwise contrary to public law.’  
4
 ‘Short selling win gives UK third victory in Brussels clash’, The Financial Times, 12 September 2013. In addition to EU 
agency powers, the UK has fought the EU initiatives on financial transaction tax and Libor benchmark rate. 
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‘diversification of the EU executive by proliferation of independent bodies’.5 The financial 
crisis paved the way for a new generation of EU agencies which were more independent both 
vis-à-vis markets and EU political institutions.6 As noted by Advocate General Jääskinen, the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) are of an entirely different breed in that they can, 
e.g. under the contested Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation, issue ‘legally binding 
decisions directed at individual legal entities in substitution for either a decision, or the 
inaction, of a competent national authority.’7 
Meanwhile, fundamental legal questions have remained unanswered. The rise of agencies has 
not been guided by an overall vision as to their role in the administration of EU law, and 
political initiatives on setting clearer rules for EU agencies have thus far been produced 
unimpressive results.8 No legal account of EU agencies fails to mention that the Union 
primary law does not explicitly recognise the competence of EU agencies to adopt legally 
binding measures. This has not slowed down the mushrooming of agencies9, or prohibited 
delegation of regulatory decision-making powers to agencies operating on various policy 
areas, such as plant varieties (CPVO), aviation safety (EASA) and chemicals (ECHA). Legal 
uncertainty nevertheless sheds doubt on the limits of institutional experimentation. The 
‘delegation question’ has remained vital after the Lisbon Treaty, too, as the Treaty did not 
seem to close the growing gap between primary law, remaining silent on agencies’ decision-
                                                     
5
 As the trend is aptly described (but not presented as a distinct definition) by H.C.H. Hofmann and A. Morini in ‘The 
Pluralisation of EU Executive – Aspects of “Agencification”’ 37 European Law Review (2012) p. 419, at p. 421 For a 
less legalistic perspective, see D. Curtin and R. Dehousse, ‘European Union agencies: tipping the balance’, in J. Trondal, 
M. Busuioc and M. Groenleer (eds.), The agency phenomenon in the European Union: Emergence, institutionalisation 
and everyday decision-making (Manchester University Press 2012).  
6
 E. Chiti, ‘An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European 
Agencies’, 46 Common Market Law Review (2009) p. 1395, at p. 1433. 
7
 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, delivered on 12 September 2013 in ECJ, 22 January 2014 , Case C-270/12, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union Judgment of 
the Court (Grand Chamber), para. 24. 
8
 See J.–D. Schneider, ‘A Common Framework for Decentralized EU Agencies and the Meroni doctrine’, 61 Administrative 
Law Review (2009) p. 29, at p. 33–34.  
9
 Creation of EU agencies accelerated in the 1990s and their present count exceeds 40. More than 30 of them are 
‘decentralised’ agencies, which means that they operate in permanent capacity and carry out certain technical, scientific 
or managerial tasks allocated to them in order to help the EU institutions make and implement policies. See 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm. <last visited 15 September 2014> “Executive” agencies, on the other 
hand, are set up for a fixed period.  
  
3 
making powers, and a growing body of secondary law creating them.10 As it turned out, the 
Court in Short selling held that this gap had been closed. 
An established non-delegation jurisprudence covers for TFEU’s shortcomings. The general 
principles stated in the Court of Justice’s Meroni judgement more than 50 years ago11 still 
form the foundations of the Union’s non-delegation doctrine. Meroni continues to be 
referenced by Courts
12
, but its validity in the post-Lisbon Union has been questioned.13 
However, until Short Selling Meroni requirements have not been directly applied to EU 
agencies. To that end, the less well-known Romano ruling, which concerned delegation of 
powers directly by the Council to a non-Treaty based body, has provided an important 
extension to Meroni. In that case the Court of Justice held that such bodies could not adopt 
acts having the ‘force of law’.14 
Finally, alongside these normative constraints of delegation, the creation of EU agencies and 
their empowerment through secondary law are substantively constrained by their legal basis.15 
Article 114 TFEU, allowing the adoption of harmonizing measures to further the internal 
market, provides the legal basis for an increasing number of EU agencies, including the 
ESAs. Article 114 TFEU and the ESAs’ unprecedented powers were a hard fit, and doubts 
were raised if there existed a gap between ‘what is politically and economically desirable and 
constitutionally possible’.16 The Banking Union project has stretched the boundaries of the 
single market Article even further, especially as it was selected as the legal base also for the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).17 
                                                     
10
 H. H. Hofmann, ‘Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality’15 
European Law Journal (2009) p. 482 at p. 501. 
11
 ECJ, 13 June 1958, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority. 
12
 As recorded by S. Griller and A. Orator in ‘Everything Under Control? The ‘way forward’ for the European agencies in 
the footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine’ 35 European Law Review (2010) p. 3, at p. 21. 
13
 R. Schütze, ‘Delegated Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis’ 74 Modern Law Review 
(2011) p. 661, at p. 674. In the words of Chiti: “[…]the jurisprudence of 1958 cannot be considered as a sufficient 
foundations to justify such clear-cut conclusions on the limits to European agencies’ powers and tasks.” Chiti, supra n 6, 
at p. 1422. See also Schneider supra n. 8 , at p. 37–40.  
14
 ECJ, 14 May 1981, Case 98/80 Romano v Institut nationa d’assurance maladie-invalidité, at para. 20. 
15
 A distinction between normative and substantive constraints is highlighted by K. Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the Regulatory 
Process: “delegation of powers” in the European Community’ 18 European Law Review (1993) p. 23, at p. 44. 
16
 E. Fahey, ‘Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes? Reflections on the legal Basis of the European Banking 
Authority’ 74 The Modern Law Review (2011) p. 581, at p. 582. 
17
 The SRM establishes an EU-level resolution fund for banks. Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
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The UK’s pleas in Short selling addressed each of the above aspects and consequently the 
ruling clarifies several constitutional problems pertaining to habitual transfer of decision-
making powers to non-Treaty based EU bodies. However, this case note shows that in its 
endeavour to bridge the constitutional gap in the EU executive rule-making, the Court at the 
same time made other constitutional problems more salient. Before examining the case in 
more detail, the complex political and economic background of the Short Selling Regulation 
will be presented.  
BACKGROUND 
 ESMA’s powers 
The three ESAs, including ESMA, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)18 constitute the Union level of the 
new European System of Financial Supervision. The system also entails a framework for 
macro-prudential supervision of financial markets. This function is primarily entrusted to the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), a body that operates under the auspices of the 
European Central Bank.19 Unlike ESAs, ESRB lacks legal personality. 
The ESAs’ have first of all a regulatory task to contribute to the establishment of common 
regulatory and supervisory standards and practices and to promote consistent application of 
legally binding Union acts.
20
 In addition to issuing non-binding opinions, guidelines, and 
recommendations, ESAs have an important role in developing binding technical standards, 
which the Commission adopts in accordance with the post-Lisbon framework for delegated 
law-making (Articles 290 and 291 TFEU).21 
The Short selling case did not concern ESMA’s rule-making powers per se but rather its 
direct intervention powers. The Member State authorities remain in charge of day-to-day 
(Contd.)                                                                  
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution 
Fund, O.J. L 225. 
18
 Respective establishing Regulations are (EU) No. 1093/2010 (EBA), (EU) 1094/2010 (EIOPA), (EU) 1095/2010 (ESMA) 
[2010] OJ L331. 
19
 See generally E. Wymeersch,  The reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System – An Overview, European 
Company and Financial Law Review (2010) Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 240–265. 
20
 Regulation 1095/2010 (The ESMA Regulation), Arts. 8(1)(a) and (b). 
21
 For a legal and consitutional analysis of the ESAs powers, see e.g. M. Busuioc, ‘Rule-Making by the European Financial 
Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope’ 19 European Law Journal (2013) and P. Schammo, ‘The European 
Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the Veil on the Allocation of Powers’  48 Common Market Law Review (2011). 
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supervision of their markets and market participants, but ESAs have been allocated special 
powers to address decisions to national authorities, and in certain exceptional cases directly to 
financial market participants. The basic grounds for action are a) a ‘breach of EU law’, b) 
existence of an ‘emergency’ situation calling for ESMA’s action and c) settlement of disputes 
between national supervisors.22 These direct intervention powers are exceptional and subject 
to numerous conditions, but they are significant in that they represent a more intervention-
based model of financial supervision, which rests on a degree of hierarchical control.23 
However, ESMA’s intervention powers under the challenged Article 28 of the Short Selling 
Regulation do not fall under the above-mentioned grounds for direct action either. The powers 
granted under Article 28 follow the formula adopted in Article 9(5) of the Regulation 
establishing ESMA (henceforth: the ESMA Regulation). That Article provides that in the 
cases specified and under the conditions laid down in the legislative acts covered by ESMA’s 
mandate, ESMA may temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that threaten 
the orderly functioning of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the 
financial system in the Union. Such intervention powers, even if they technically fall under 
ESMA’s consumer protection mandate, represent the “macro” side of ESMA’s powers which 
seek to promote the stability, integrity and transparency of financial markets.24 The next 
Section presents the substance and context of Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation. 
Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation 
Under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation ESMA can either require disclosure of 
certain financial positions to the public or prohibit or restrict trading of short-like financial 
positions. Why were such powers allocated to an EU agency instead of keeping them at 
national level? The answer to this question lies in the unusual political and economic 
background that gave rise to the Short Selling Regulation. 
                                                     
22
 The ESMA Regulation, Arts. 17–19.  
23
 See P. Schammo, ”EU Day-to-Day Supervision of Intervention-based Supervision: Which Way Forward for the European 
System of Financial Supervision, 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2012), p. 771, at p. 792. 
24
 The ESMA Regulation, rec. 12. See also Art. 1(5) setting the objective for ESMA to protect the public interest by 
contributing to the short, medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system. 
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The purpose of short selling is to benefit from, or to hedge against, falling prices of a given 
financial instrument.25 Though short selling is a well-established technique and serves a 
pivotal function in financial markets, it also gives a powerful tool for speculators, and in times 
of distress short selling can exacerbate a downward spiral in prices.26 It is commonly held that 
short selling played an important role in the escalation of the financial crisis in Europe. 
Sovereign debt of several Member States as well as shares of (systemically) important 
financial institutions became an object of increased short selling activity. Member States’ 
regulators tried to alleviate the situation with diverse regulatory responses. The interventions 
ranged from temporary bans on short selling of certain specified financial instruments (e.g. 
Greece) to statutory bans on naked short selling27 (e.g. Germany) as well as enacting various 
kinds of disclosure requirements. Some Member States opted for no action.28 
The resulting uncertainty was made possible and fuelled by the lack of an EU level legislative 
framework and the inability of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR, 
ESMA’s predecessor) to coordinate regulatory responses of its member regulators.29 
Fragmentation and the absence of a level-playing field were feared to limit the effectiveness 
of the national measures imposed, to lead to a significant increase in compliance costs for 
firms30, and ultimately push investors to circumvent jurisdiction-specific restrictions by 
                                                     
25
 Detailed definion is provided in the Art. 2(1) of the Short Selling Regulation. More simply, in a standard short sale 
transaction, a short seller sells certain financial instruments (e.g. shares, credit instruments, interest rates, currencies, 
commodities) that he or she does not really own, but which he or she has borrowed (or agreed to borrow) from the market 
through a securities lending arrangement. The rationale is to buy and return equivalent securities at a later time when the 
price has fallen, and pocket the difference. The Commission has described short selling as “the sale of a security that the 
seller does not own, with the intention of buying back an identical security at a later point in time in order to be able to 
deliver the security.” See Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps - Frequently 
asked questions, MEMO/10/409, Brussels, 15 September 2010. 
26
 On the economic arguments in favor and against short selling, see J. Payne, ‘The Regulation of Short Selling and Its 
Reform in Europe’ 13 European Business Organization Law Review (2012) p. 414. 
27
 Naked short selling happens where the seller has not actually borrowed the securities at the time of the sale, or ensured that 
such borrowing can happen in the future. The Short Selling Regulation presents several requirements limiting the use of 
and risks pertaining to naked short selling. 
28
 On the measures adopted, see Commission, impact assessment, accompanying the Proposal for the Short Selling 
Regulation Brussels, SEC(2010) 1055, at p. 17–19. For a detailed list of measures taken in the Member States, see 
ESMA, Update on Measures adopted by Competent Authorities on Short Selling, ESMA/2011/39a, 24 July 2012. 
29
 E. Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’, in E. Wymeersch, K. J. 
Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (eds.) Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP, 2012), p. 111–158, at 
p. 124–125.  
30
 The compliance costs concerns were also reported by the CESR under its preparatory work. See CESR, Model for a Pan-
European Short Selling Disclosure Regime, CESR/10-088, at p. 3. 
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carrying out transactions elsewhere.31 In light of these concerns, and following a 
recommendation from the CESR, the Commission introduced in 2010 a proposal for a 
Regulation, with the purpose to: 
“harmonise requirements relating to short selling across the European Union, harmonise the 
powers that regulators may use in exceptional situations where there is a serious threat to financial 
stability or market confidence and ensure greater co-ordination and consistency between Member 
States in such situations.”
32
 
The primary target of the Short Selling Regulation was therefore not to consolidate market 
intervention powers within the EU authorities, but to harmonise the powers of national 
competent authorities in order to promote legal certainty and financial stability. All regulators 
would have similar powers to temporarily restrict or ban short selling in exceptional situations 
and ESMA would foster co-ordination (e.g. by issuing opinions).33 However, harmonisation 
of powers of national authorities did not address the underlying problem caused by 
decentralised supervision. In increasingly integrated EU financial markets significant market 
disruptions often have cross-border effects that may affect the functioning of the entire 
internal financial market. In the face of grave market dysfunction, national authorities might 
not always be the best decision makers, nor might simple coordinative functions of ESMA be 
sufficient if swift intervention is needed.34 Also, EU level action becomes indispensable 
whenever there is a real risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
Therefore, Article 28 gives ESMA intervention powers that are parallel to those harmonised 
at the Member State level. ESMA can, when specified conditions (Art. 28(2) and 28(3)) are 
met, either (1) require certain net short positions in relation to a specific financial instrument 
to be disclosed to the public or (2) prohibit or impose conditions on the entry into a short sale 
or a similar transaction with respect to certain financial instruments. Intervention powers of 
ESMA are secondary to those of national authorities35 but superior in the sense that measures 
                                                     
31
 A well-known art also known as regulatory arbitrage. Ibid., p. 30–32. 
32
 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling and certain aspects 
of Credit Default Swaps, COM(2010) 482 final, Brussels, 15 September 2010. 
33
 See Commission, Press Release, New framework to increase transparency and ensure coordination for short selling and 
Credit Default Swaps, IP/10/1126, Brussels, 15 September 2010. 
34
 On the problems of effective supervisory coordination and crisis resolution measures in the absense of supranational 
authority, see G. Ferrarini and F. Chiodini, ‘Nationally Fragmented Supervision over Multinational Banks as a Source of 
Systemic Risk: A Critical Analysis of Recent Reforms’ in E. Wymeersch, K. J. Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (eds.) Financial 
Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP, 2012), at p. 193 – 231. 
35
 ESMA can take action only if the threat has not been addressed by a competent authority at all, or that it has not been 
addressed adequately.  The Short Selling Regulation, Article 28(2)(b)). 
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adopted by ESMA will prevail over any previous measure taken by a competent authority 
(Art. 28(11)). The ESMA Regulation imposes several conditions and constraints on the use of 
these exceptional and far-reaching powers. This issue, in large part determining the 
lawfulness of the challenged empowerment, will be taken up below. 
THE JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT 
The UK based its plea on the illegality of Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation on four 
grounds: 
 First, the authority vested in ESMA breaches the limits set in the Meroni judgment;  
 Second, the article allows ESMA to pass measures of ‘general application’ having the 
force of law and thus it contradicts the Court’s ruling in Romano; 
 Third, the article purports to confer the power on ESMA to adopt non-legislative acts 
of general application in a manner that breaches Articles 290 and 291 TFEU; and 
 Fourth, Article 114 TFEU is not an appropriate legal basis for the powers granted. 
In his Opinion delivered on 12 September 2013, Advocate General Jääskinen proposed that 
the Court dismisses the first three of the UK’s pleas. The Advocate General agreed with the 
Council and Parliament in that the EU agency regime has been ‘modernised’ with changes 
brought about by the TFEU, particularly regarding the more effective judicial safeguards.36 In 
the Advocate General’s view enhanced access to court under TFEU balances ESMA’s right to 
take direct, binding action. However, Advocate General Jääskinen found, in agreement with 
the UK, that Article 114 TFEU was not an appropriate legal basis for the powers granted to 
ESMA under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation, concluding: 
‘The conferral of decision making powers under [Article 28] on ESMA, in substitution for the 
assessments of the competent national authorities, cannot be considered to be a measure “for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market” within 
the meaning of Article 114 TFEU’.
37
 
The Court of Justice dismissed all four pleas. 
                                                     
36
 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, supra n. 7, paras. 5–6. 
37
 Ibid., para. 37 (emphasis added). 
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Meroni 
The Court in Meroni found that the possibility to delegate implementing powers to non-
Treaty based bodies (in that case, entities established under private law) was inherent in the 
powers of the European Steel and Coal Community.38 It is therefore rather the conditions and 
qualifications laid down in Meroni for delegation of powers that have made the ruling so 
persistently influential. The ‘doctrine’ is made up of the following elements: First, a 
delegating Authority ‘could not confer upon the authority receiving the delegated powers 
different from those which the delegating authority itself received under the Treaty’ (the so-
called nemo plus principle).39 Second, delegation of powers must always be based on an 
express decision thereto and cannot be presumed.40 Third, delegation is acceptable if it is 
restricted to ‘clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can […] be subject to 
strict review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority’ whereas 
a delegation is illegal if it implies a ‘wide margin of discretion’ that makes possible the 
execution of actual economic policy.41 Finally, the Meroni case evoked the principle of 
‘balance of powers’, which provided a fundamental guarantee of the institutional structure of 
the Community.42 
In the spirit of Meroni the essence of the UK’s plea was that Article 28 of the Short Selling 
Regulation had given ESMA a “very large measure of discretion” and that factual 
assessments envisaged by the article would be “highly subjective”43 including judgements that 
could not be subjected to objective review.44 The UK acknowledged that ESMA’s decisions 
based on the article would be temporary, but because the decisions could have long-term 
consequences, this did not change legal assessment of the powers.45 
The Court found first that the Short Selling Regulation does not confer on ESMA autonomous 
power that goes beyond the regulatory framework established by the ESMA Regulation. 
                                                     
38
 ‘…the power of the High Authority to authorize or itself to make the financial arrangements mentioned in […] the Treaty 
gives it the right to entrust certain powers to such bodies subject to conditions to be determined by it and subject to its 
supervision.’ ECJ, 13 June 1958, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, p. 151. 
39
 ECJ, 13 June 1958, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, p. 150. 
40
 Ibid., p. 151. 
41
 Ibid., p. 152, 154. 
42
 Ibid., p. 152.  
43
 ECJ, 7 March 2014, Case 270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, para. 28. 
44
 Ibid., paras. 31 and 32. 
45
 Ibid., para. 33. 
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Secondly, unlike what was the case in Meroni, ESMA’s discretionary power under Article 28 
of the Short Selling Regulation is circumscribed by various conditions and criteria.46 The 
Court recorded the following limitations: ESMA can adopt measures only if they address a 
threat, with cross-border implications, to the orderly functioning, integrity or stability of 
financial markets (Art. 28(2) of the ESMA Regulation). ESMA’s powers are always 
secondary to those of national authorities.47 ESMA must also consider the extent to which the 
measure in question, e.g. does not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage or have a detrimental 
effect on the efficiency of financial markets, (Art. 28(3)).48 Substantive criteria delineating 
ESMA’s powers are further specified in the Commission delegated regulation No 918/201249. 
That regulation, as the Court notes, places emphasis on the technical factual assessment and 
confines the use of intervention powers to exceptional circumstances.50 With regard to 
procedural constraints, ESMA is always obliged to consult the ESRB and, when necessary, 
other ESAs. Prior notice of the proposed measures must be given to national authorities, and 
once adopted, the measures must be reviewed periodically (Art. 28(4) and (5)). Finally, the 
measures that ESMA can adopt are strictly confined to two. 51 
Against these conditions and constraints, the Court concluded that even if the powers 
conferred under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation arguably involve discretionary 
elements, the claim of delegation concerning “very large measure of discretion” was without 
basis. The powers are in compliance with Meroni, as they are ‘precisely delineated and 
amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating 
authority.’52 
                                                     
46
 Ibid., paras. 46 and 48. 
47
 Ibid., para. 46. 
48
 Ibid., para. 47. 
49
 Commission delegated regulation No 918/2012 of 5 July 2012 O.J. L 274/1. Article 24 sets out the criteria and factors to 
be taken into account in determining when adverse events or developments and threats arise. The reguation is binding 
upon both ESMA and national competent authorities. 
50
 ECJ, 22 January 2014, Case 270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, paras. 51 and 52. 
51
 Ibid., paras. 49–50. 
52
 Ibid., paras. 53–54. 
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Romano 
The Court’s ruling in Romano has been held as ‘the most drastic expression’ of an expansive 
reading of the Meroni prohibition.53 Even if less famous than its Meroni cousin, Romano is 
relevant for EU agencies particularly because it concerned delegation of powers by the 
Council directly to a body established by secondary Community law. A constitutional 
problem was raised by the fact that a Community body called Administrative Commission 
was delegated powers to adopt decisions of general application. In the Court’s reasoning it 
followed from both Article 155 of the EEC Treaty concerning Commission’s power to 
implement legislation (now, as amended, under Arts 290 and 291 TFEU) and the judicial 
system created by the Treaty, in particular by Articles 173 and 177 (now, as amended, Arts. 
263 and 267 TFEU), that a body such as the Administrative Commission could not be 
empowered by the Council to adopt acts having the force of law.54  
The UK claimed that the authorisation provided by Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation 
was contrary to the principles established in Romano because it grants ESMA the power to 
adopt quasi-legislative measures of general application. For example, prohibition of short 
selling of a specific financial instrument is not an individual decision because it affects the 
entire class of persons engaging in transactions in that instrument. Therefore, a decision like 
that amounts to a ‘measure of general application having the force of law’.55 
The Court submitted that Article 28 indeed concerns measures that are meant to be generally 
applicable but this was of no consequence for the legality of Article 28 powers because the 
institutional framework established by TFEU (in particular Arts 263 and 277 TFEU) 
‘expressly permits Union bodies, offices and agencies to adopt acts of general application.’56 
Thus in the Court’s view, Romano added nothing to the conditions already laid down in 
Meroni.57 
                                                     
53
 Schütze, supra n. 13, p. 674 (footnote 88). 
54
 ECJ, 14 May 1981, Case 98/80 Romano v Institut nationa d’assurance maladie-invalidité 
55
 ECJ, March 22 January 2014, Case 270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, para. 57 
56
 Ibid., para. 64–65. 
57
 Ibid., paras. 66–67. 
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Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU 
The essence of the UK’s third plea was that the Treaties gave the EU legislator no authority to 
delegate powers to adopt acts of general application (including those provided for in Article 
28 Short Selling Regulation) to an EU agency, because Articles 290 and 291 TFEU foresee 
that such powers may be given only to the Commission (and exceptionally to the Council).58 
The Court thus had to decide whether Articles 290 and 291 TFEU were indeed meant to 
provide a ‘single legal framework’ for executive powers or ‘whether other systems for the 
delegation of such powers to Union bodies, offices or agencies may be contemplated by the 
Union legislature.’59 The Court first acknowledged the fact that no Treaty provision explicitly 
allows conferral of such powers to a Union agency or other body. However, this fact could 
not mean that such powers were impossible, because a number of provisions in the TFEU 
‘presuppose that such a possibility exists’.60 The provisions the Court referred to were the 
mechanisms of judicial review, as modernised by the TFEU.61 These mechanisms will be 
reviewed below. 
In what followed, the Court stated that conferral of powers under Article 28 of the Short 
Selling Regulation ‘does not correspond to any of the situations defined in Articles 290 TFEU 
and 291 TFEU.’62 Therefore the powers conferred needed to be examined against their wider 
legal (and political) framework, including the ESMA Regulation, the Short Selling 
Regulation, but also the Regulation 1092/2010 establishing the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB), the macro-supervisory arm of the European System of Financial Supervision: 
‘[…]those regulations form part of a series of regulatory instruments adopted by the EU legislature 
so that the Union may, in view of the integration of international financial markets and the 
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contagion risk of financial crises, endeavour to promote international financial stability, as stated 
in recital 7 in the preamble to Regulation No 1092/2010.’
63
 
Consequently, the Court read Article 28 powers not ‘in isolation’ but contextually as a 
necessary part of the Union toolkit to preserve financial stability.64 
Article 114 TFEU 
In the first three of its pleas, the UK claimed in essence that Article 28 of the Short Selling 
Regulation did not intend to authorise ESMA to take individual measures, but rather measures 
of general application having the force of law. However, for the purposes of the fourth plea, 
the UK held that in the event the Court would regard Article 28 as also authorising the taking 
of individual decisions applicable to natural or legal persons, such powers would be ultra 
vires in light of Article 114 TFEU. 
The Court held that individual decisions were indeed possible: Article 28 enables the adoption 
of measures that ‘may take the form, where necessary, of decisions directed at certain 
participants in those markets.’65 So the problem was could such individual measures satisfy 
the requirements of Article 114 TFEU, which, as the Court noted, presents two different 
conditions. First, measures should be adopted for the purposes of approximation of provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member States and, second, have 
as their objective the establishment and functioning of the internal market.66 The Advocate 
General’s had answered the questions in the negative: in his opinion the outcome of the 
activation of ESMA’s powers under Article 28 is not harmonisation, or the adoption of a 
uniform practice at the Member States level, but replacement of national decision-making 
under certain provisions with EU level decision making.67 
With regard to the first condition, the Court relied on two important cases, United Kingdom v 
Parliament and Council (ENISA)68 and United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (Smoke 
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flavourings).69 In Smoke flavourings the Court interpreted the expression ‘measures for the 
approximation’ as set forth in Article 114 TFEU, as representing an intention 
‘to confer on the Union legislature, depending on the general context and the specific 
circumstances of the matter to be harmonised, discretion as regards the most appropriate method 
of harmonisation for achieving the desired result, especially in fields with complex technical 
features’
70
 
In ENISA, on the other hand, it was held that the EU legislature can establish an EU body 
responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of harmonisation, because:  
‘nothing in the wording of Article 95 EC [now Article 114 TFEU] implies that the addressees of 
the measures adopted by the Community legislature on the basis of that provision can only be the 
individual Member States’.
71
 
Accordingly, the Court concluded, the discretion of the EU legislature as regards the method 
of harmonisation for achieving the desired result allows delegation to an agency of certain 
implementation powers to further the harmonisation process. This is particularly the case 
where such measures require specific professional and technical expertise and the ability to 
respond swiftly and appropriately.72 To the extent that the measures adopted would be 
applicable to specific persons or products, the Court evoked the case Germany v Council 
(General product safety), in which the notion of ‘measures for the approximation’ was 
interpreted as also encompassing measures that relate ‘to a specific product or class of 
products as well as, if necessary, individual measures concerning those products.’73 
In more substantive assessment the Court merely recorded that the measures adopted by 
Member States on their respective markets had clearly been divergent and the legislature’s 
target was to end the fragmented situation.74 To reach that target ESMA was conferred powers 
to coordinate national measures or to take the measures itself when necessary. Therefore, 
Article 28 Short Selling Regulation ‘is in fact directed at the harmonisation of the Member 
States’ laws, regulations and administrative provisions.’75 
                                                     
69
 ECJ, 6 December 2005, Case C‑ 66/04 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council. 
70
 Ibid., para. 45. 
71
 ECJ, 2 May 2006, Case C-217/04 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, para. 44. 
72
 ECJ, 7 March 2014, Case 270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, para. 105. 
73
 ECJ, 9 August 1994, Case C‑359/92 Germany v Council, para. 37. 
74
 ECJ, 7 March 2014, Case 270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, paras. 109 and 111 
75
 Ibid. paras. 110 and 112. 
  
15 
With regard to the second condition, namely that the object of the measures in question must 
be to further the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the Court, citing 
various recitals in the preamble of the Short Selling Regulation, held that it was objectively 
apparent that the purpose of Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation was in fact to improve 
the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in the financial 
field.76 
COMMENTS 
An updated Meroni jurisprudence 
Meroni and Romano were decided at a time of an underdeveloped system of judicial 
protection. In Meroni the Court reasoned quite correctly that if the delegation of powers 
renders them ineligible to judicial review, the powers in effect become more extensive. 
77
 This 
gap in the Union’s constitutional system of judicial protection is now closed. Article 263 
TFEU explicitly extends the judicial review of the Court of Justice to acts of EU agencies 
when they intend to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. The validity and 
interpretation of acts of agencies can be referred to review by Member States’ courts and 
tribunals (Art. 267 TFEU) and such acts may be subject to a plea of illegality (Art. 277 
TFEU). Because of the better coverage of the Union’s system of judicial review the powers 
delegated under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation are not ‘different from those which 
the delegating authority itself received’, which was the finding in Meroni.  
As is well know, this Treaty fix did not bring about a constitutional revolution in the sense 
that judicial review of acts of agencies had already been confirmed in the practice of the Court 
of Justice. Les Verts provided that ‘in a Community based on the rule of law acts intended to 
produce legal effects have to be subject to judicial review.’78 In Sogelma it was confirmed that 
this principle also applied to agency acts in accordance with the principle that ‘[…]any act of 
                                                     
76
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a Community body intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties must be open to 
judicial review.’79 
The practical relevance of the Short selling judgement with regard to Meroni is the guidance 
it provides for the in casu assessments of the boundaries and conditions for the delegation 
(and conferral) of powers. The Court restated the importance of both sufficient substantive 
and procedural constraints, which should render the powers ‘precisely delineated and 
amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating 
authority.’80 
ESMA’s direct intervention powers are indeed subjected to numerous conditions and 
safeguards, both ex ante and ex post.81 ESMA’s positive powers under Article 28 of the Short 
Selling Regulation are strictly confined, which means that despite the powers are far-reaching, 
ESMA has little discretion as to how to intervene. In terms of level of discretion conferred on 
ESMA, the question of when to intervene seems much more problematic.
82
 Here the Court 
underlined the importance of conditions set forth in the Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) No 918/2012. That act indeed provides an additional yardstick in line with the Meroni 
requirement that a delegation must be exposable ‘to strict review in the light of objective 
criteria’.83 Article 24 of the Regulation (EU) No 918/2012 seeks to specify the types of threats 
justifying intervention and emphasizes the technical and factual nature of the assessment. 
However, technical as they may be, such assessments most certainly are not simple exercises 
of ‘subsuming facts into rules’84 but require difficult balancing between conflicting objectives 
and risks involved. Product regulation in the environment of financial markets is a task that is 
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‘notoriously complex’.85 One may question if ESMA is the mots appropriate body to make 
such systemic assessments (e.g. effects on liquidity). ESMA’s core tasks relate to micro-
prudential supervision and the establishment of the single rulebook. 
To that end, it makes sense that ESMA must consult ESRB, the macro-prudential arm of EU 
financial supervision. ESRB’s input serves a legitimizing function with respect to the general 
requirement of rationality of Union administrative action.86 But the setting strikes as peculiar 
if we look at the role agencies have usually played in the administration of Union law. The 
agencies have traditionally offered scientific and other expertise to aid the implementation of 
EU law (usually by the Commission), not executed EU law on the basis of expert opinions 
acquired elsewhere. The European System of Financial Supervision, with its micro–macro 
division and silo-based model of supervision is not a seamlessly functioning community of 
experts, but rather a collection of bodies with differing powers and agenda.  
Far from rendering the Meroni doctrine obsolete, the Short Selling ruling brings the 
jurisprudence to the post-Lisbon age. As expected, the Court confirmed for the first time that 
the Meroni restrictions also circumscribe the empowerment of Union agencies. But what is 
particularly important is that Meroni applies regardless of whether the act under scrutiny is a 
sub-delegation by the Commission, or a direct empowerment embedded in the legislative act 
itself. The Court in Short Selling thus authorised a relatively wide application of Meroni 
principles to generally police the creation and transfer of implementing power within the 
Union. Wide reading also dodges the difficult problem on the nature of ‘delegation’, i.e. the 
question of if the powers delegated were vested in the delegating authority, i.e. the legislator, 
in the first place, or if something new was created.87 Advocate General Jääskinen was right in 
his view that Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation actually makes possible the 
replacement of national decision-making under certain provisions with EU level decision 
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making.88 ‘Delegation’ indeed appears ill-suited to describe such vertical transfer of powers 
from the national to the EU level.89 Moreover, while the Court widened the applicability of 
the ‘essential’ Meroni principles, it at the same time dismissed several important elements 
from the original decision, introducing something that could be called a ‘Meroni-light 
doctrine’.90 It remains to be seen to what extent Meroni principles will need to accommodate 
democratic legitimacy concerns. Indeed, as democracy is a founding principle of EU law 
(Arts 2 and 10 TEU), any delegation of power beyond the remit of the treaty-based European 
institutions should be democratically legitimised.91 
However, the Court’s non-restrictive reading of Meroni can be welcomed. Meroni principles 
will undoubtedly serve an important function in filling another constitutional gap in EU law 
that is becoming more visible by the day, that is, the lack of consistency in controls for 
various forms of executive rule-making taking place beyond the TFEU-based hierarchy of 
norms. Next section will reflect more upon this. 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU and the hierarchy of Union acts 
After the Short selling Romano’s precedential value appears rather crippled. The notion in 
Romano of ‘acts having the force of law’ has raised some controversy, not least because of 
the apparent disparity between the Judgement’s different language versions. Did the Court 
refer to legislative measures of general application or to all kinds of legally binding acts, 
including decisions in individual cases?92  This question does not seem relevant anymore. 
However, Romano also concerned the problem of ‘exclusivity’ of implementing powers, i.e. 
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the possibility to delegate implementing powers to a body different than that foreseen in the 
Treaty (i.e. Commission).93 Here Romano merges with the ‘exclusivity question’ concerning 
the Union framework for non-legislative acts as laid down in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
The hierarchy of EU norms as established in the Lisbon Treaty appears straightforward. All 
legislative acts are crafted through and adopted by legislative procedures (Art. 289(3)). In 
addition, TFEU recognizes two categories of binding non-legislative acts: Delegated acts are 
quasi-legislative acts that can amend or supplement non-essential elements of legislative acts 
(Art. 290 TFEU)94 whereas implementing acts can be used where uniform conditions for 
implementing legally binding Union acts are needed (Art. 291 TFEU). Given that binding 
Union acts can exist in the form of regulations, directives or decisions, a simple arithmetic 
assessment gives us 9 basic categories of binding Union acts (3 levels of acts x 3 types of 
acts).95  
But how do ESMA’s powers under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation fit into this 
hierarchy of Union’s norms? Clearly, they do not. The post-Lisbon hierarchy of norms has 
rightly been criticized as misleadingly simple.
96
 Perhaps the most serious limitation of the 
TFEU based hierarchy is the constitutional ambiguity that surrounds the implementation of 
EU law through various binding executive acts. The Lisbon Treaty did not change the fact 
that this area of rule-making ‘operates in a constitutional twilight zone.’97 Short selling 
underlines these existing constitutional pitfalls. The Court held that TFEU does not prevent 
delegation of executive powers by the Legislature directly to non-Treaty based bodies, in a 
manner that ‘does not correspond to any of the situations defined in Articles 290 TFEU and 
291 TFEU’.98 This view represents another step forward in the restructuring of EU executive 
law-making after the Lisbon Treaty, which indeed seems to have brought about nothing less 
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than an ‘executive revolution’.99 As noted above, the possibility of judicial review of acts of 
agencies had already been confirmed in the practice of the Court of Justice and here the TFEU 
did little more than elevate to the level of the Treaties what was already firmly established in 
jurisprudence. But in the case at hand, the Court took the provisions beyond confirmatory 
status and gave them a constitutive effect. The reasoning goes that a constitutional mandate to 
confer powers to agencies and other bodies is, despite omitted from the text of the Treaties, a 
sine qua non of the existence of the judicial review mechanism as set up by the TFEU.100 The 
Court thus bridged, or at least narrowed, the gap that has been widening between increasing 
powers of European agencies and the lack of express recognition of such powers in the 
Treaties.101 
So if Articles 290 and 291 TFEU do not set up a closed system of delegation, like the Court 
stated in Short selling, how does such an ‘open system of delegation’ fit with the 
‘constitutional checks and balances’ historically vested in the Treaties?102 The answer to this 
question is problematic for the simple reason that the mechanisms of political control over the 
use of delegated powers operate in closed system. The comitology regime, providing the most 
important political safeguard for the conferral of implementing powers,103 allows the Member 
States to control through committees the adoption by the Commission of implementing acts.104  
However, comitology applies only to Article 291 TFEU implementing acts. So the obvious 
question arises: how is the use of executive power by EU agencies, now explicitly recognized, 
controlled? Indeed, when the delegation of executive power is done in a manner that ‘does not 
correspond to any of the situations defined in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU’ there is no 
systematic approach. 
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Nevertheless, controlling executive rule-making of an EU agency such as ESMA through 
special committees composed of Member State experts would seem impractical. In the case of 
ESMA the heads of national authorities are the only voting members sitting in the Board of 
Supervision of ESMA.105 Granted, like the Commission, ESMA’s Board of Supervisors 
should, when carrying out its tasks, act independently and objectively in the sole interest of 
the Union as a whole.106 The extent to which this requirement matches political reality is 
debatable, but it would nevertheless seem peculiar to subject board members of ESMA, the 
highest ranking national officials in the field of securities markets supervision, to the control 
of national experts. In this respect, the agency as a Union executive organ, indeed appears to 
be ‘a midway solution between vesting implementing authority in either the Commission or 
the Council, on the one hand, or leaving it to the Member States, on the other.’107 
The above-said does not mean that legitimacy concerns are without basis. A number of 
governance issues relate to the implementation of EU policies by specialised agencies and this 
discussion is by no means a new one.108 Lack of sufficient mechanisms for accountability and 
control of agency decision-making has aroused critical academic discussion for quite some 
time already109 and demands for constitutionalising and systematising the forms of EU 
executive rule-making outside existing formal procedures seem more pressing than ever.110 
The Commission-lead political process on placing EU agencies within Union administration 
has hitherto built on establishing guiding principles and operationalizing them into 
Commission guidelines.111  
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The next section assesses something that neither the Court nor the Advocate General did, i.e. 
the wider system of ESAs emergency powers. The purpose is to demonstrate how there exists 
significant incoherence in the system of oversight of the most far-reaching of ESMA’s 
intervention powers. 
Safeguards against ESMA’s emergency powers  
As noted above, the powers conferred by Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation follow the 
formula set up in Article 9(5) of the ESMA Regulation. That Article provides that ESMA may 
temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that threaten the orderly functioning 
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the Union’s financial system. Such action 
can be taken in two different scenarios: (1) in cases that are specified and under the conditions 
laid down in the legislative acts covered by ESMA’s substantive mandate (as set forth in Art. 
1(2) of the ESMA Regulation) or (2) if so required in the case of an ‘emergency situation’ in 
accordance with Article 18 of the ESMA Regulation. The word ‘or’ above is important as it 
distinguishes two independent and very different legal grounds for ESMA’s direct action. 
What are the latter Article 18 emergency situations and how do they relate to the powers 
conferred on ESMA under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation? 
Article 18 of the ESMA Regulation is a constituent part of a ‘superstructure’ which has been 
established to prevent and handle financial crises.112 Under that Article, ESMA can in 
situations of emergency adopt individual decisions requiring competent authorities to take 
action in order to ensure that the requirements laid down in EU legislation are met (Art. 18(3) 
and (4)). Like ESMA’s powers under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation, Article 18 
measures can exceptionally be directly applicable to financial market participants, e.g. 
requiring cessation of a stability threatening practice. Such decision can be taken if the 
national competent authority does not apply the relevant EU legislation (falling under 
ESMA’s mandate), or applies them in a way that is in manifest breach of that legislation, and 
‘where urgent remedying is necessary’ to restore the functioning and integrity of financial 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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markets or the stability of the financial system. Again, the measures adopted prevail over any 
previous decisions adopted by the national authorities on the same matter (Art. 18(5)).  
Unlike Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation, the emergency framework of Article 18 of 
the ESMA Regulation is subject to default ex ante political safeguards. As a rule it is up to the 
Council, after consulting the Commission, the ESRB and, if needed, other ESAs, to adopt a 
decision addressed to ESMA in which the existence of an emergency situation is determined. 
ESMA, the Commission or the ESRB can each alone request such a decision. Once adopted, 
the Council must review the decision at appropriate intervals and at least once a month, at the 
risk of said decision expiring. The Council may discontinue the emergency situation at any 
time (Art. 18(2)). These safeguards counterbalance the discretionary powers conferred and 
serve an important legitimising function.113 
In terms of substance of powers, Article 9(5) of the ESMA Regulation overlaps with the 
Article 18 emergency situations. In Article 18 emergency situations (requiring ‘declaration’) 
ESMA could in theory intervene also in the event the requirements of Short Selling 
Regulation are not being met and the measures could go beyond what is prescribed in Article 
28 of the Short Selling Regulation. But in terms of political and procedural safeguards, the 
powers granted by Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation are fundamentally different from 
the above ‘emergency situation’ powers. Instead of mandatory political safeguards, their 
exercise relies primarily on ad hoc safeguards established by subsequent legislation. This 
means that the Council does not exercise any direct control over ESMA’s ‘substitutive’ 
powers vis-à-vis national authorities. The only relevant procedural limitation of ESMA’s 
discretion under Article 28 is the mandatory consultation of the ESRB.114 
Consequently, the relationship between emergency measures based on Article 9(5) and 
Article 18 of the ESMA Regulation seems obscure: the powers are of a similar legal status, 
but they have two important differences: first, the powers under Article 28 of the Short 
Selling Regulation are more limited in substance and second, action under Article 9(5) is 
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always temporary which is not the case in Article 18 situations. Especially the latter point 
emphasizes the importance of effective procedural safeguards after the decision has been 
made (e.g. mandatory review). These differences justify at least in part the disparity in 
safeguards. But the respective scope and functions of these very different intervention powers 
are not entirely clear. For instance, while Article 9(5) refers to ‘certain financial activities that 
threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets’, Article 18 refers to 
‘adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity 
of financial markets’. The difference appears to be a matter of degree. It is equally hard to tell 
the difference between powers that have financial stability and orderly functioning of 
financial markets as their target per se, and powers that seek to prevent instability and market 
malfunction in order to somehow protect consumers or investors. 
Why was Article 9(5) of the ESMA regulation created then? Again, a particular political 
background surrounds Article 9(5) of the ESMA regulation. The provision was not included 
in the original Commission proposal for the legislative foundation of ESAs, but the addition 
was introduced by the Parliament in the first reading.115 It responded, again, to the heightened 
concerns raised by serious coordination problems pertaining to regulation of short selling in 
the EU markets.116 Nevertheless, the fact that Article 9(5) of the ESMA Regulation was 
designed with a specific set of problems in mind does not preclude using it as a template for 
further transfer of executive power to the ESMA.117 Indeed, in its recent review of the 
European System of Financial Supervision, the Commission even elaborated whether Article 
9(5) could be converted into a ‘self-standing empowerment’.118 Such development would 
certainly marginalise further the emergency framework under Article 18 of the ESMA 
Regulation. Another possibility is that declaration by the Council of an emergency situation 
will become the ultima ratio option reserved solely for situations where full-blown and 
serious crises need to be contained rather than prevented. 
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Financial stability measures and Article 114 TFEU 
With regard to the dismissal of the fourth and final plea of the UK, the judgement of the Court 
of Justice relinquishes some of the pressure placed on Article 114 TFEU that provides the 
primary Treaty anchor of the EU’s nascent financial supervisory system. Had the Court 
concurred with the Advocate General’s opinion, and especially his reasoning, a pivotal 
building block of the supervisory system would have been undermined.119 The Advocate 
General’s key reasoning is worth repeating:  
‘The conferral of decision making powers under [Article 28] on ESMA, in substitution for the 
assessments of the competent national authorities, cannot be considered to be a measure “for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market” within 
the meaning of Article 114 TFEU’.
120
 
This line of reasoning risked throwing the baby out with the bath water in the sense that all 
executive decisions taken by the ESAs concerning financial market participants directly, or 
national authorities in case of settlement of disagreements, prevail over any previous decision 
adopted by the competent authorities on the same matter.121 Had the court agreed and given in 
its assessment a central role to the fact that ESMAs powers are substitutive in nature, this 
might have encouraged further incredulity towards direct intervention powers based on 
Article 114 TFEU.122 
The ENISA case123 provides an explicit justification for the choice to base all new EU 
supervisory bodies (including ESMA) on Article 114 TFEU.124 The Advocate General argued 
however that the powers of ESMA under Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation, which 
are binding, exceed the limits established in ENISA.125 In his view, 
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‘If a mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms or distortions of competition liable to result therefrom were 
sufficient to justify the choice of Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance 
with the proper legal basis might be rendered nugatory.’
126
 
Interestingly, Advocate General Kokott’s conclusion in ENISA also deviated from the final 
ruling of the Court.127 Her narrow view or Article 114 TFEU in ENISA has been critiqued 
inter alia by Tridimas, who argues that such an approach would foreclose institutional 
experimentation and serve as an obstacle for finding optimum structures of government.128 
Another case that could have supported restrictive reading of Article 114 TFEU is Tobacco 
advertising.129 In that case the Court seemed to assert its ‘constitutional role in controlling 
political infidelity to the principle that the EU’s scope for action is limited to that mandated 
by the founding Treaties[…]’.130 The Court concluded that the genuine objective of the 
directive in question was not the internal market, but rather public health.131 However, 
subsequent case law has made Tobacco advertising look more like an anomaly.132 
The Court in Short selling reads the internal market Article in a way that seems consistent 
with the established jurisprudence. Article 114 TFEU provides a legal basis for measures to 
preserve the functioning of the Single Market, but it requires that such measures must always 
entail a sufficient element of harmonisation. After a succinct and straightforward analysis the 
Court found that Article 28 fulfilled both these conditions. Contrary to the proposal of the 
Advocate General, the Court decided not to give weight to the fact that Article 28 gives 
ESMA powers that can substitute the assessments of the competent national authorities. For 
the Court this was merely a question of an appropriate ‘method of harmonisation’133 
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The Court’s approach can be welcomed in the sense that constitutional analysis of delegated 
powers should distinguish between questions regarding the extent of powers and discretion 
delegated or conferred on the one hand, and the function and purpose of these powers on the 
other. But with regard to the latter, one increasingly salient problem pertaining to the use of 
Article 114 TFEU as the Treaty basis for financial supervisory reforms was neither addressed 
by the Advocate General nor by the Court. The broadening concept of harmonization is 
becoming increasingly elusive, as it must accommodate legislative initiatives whose primary 
function and purpose is to preserve the stability and orderly functioning of the financial 
system.134 Article 9(5) of the ESMA Regulation, for instance, is more closely related to issues 
of financial stability and systemic risk than to ‘micro-protection’ issues.135 The Court in Short 
selling also noted as part of its contextual interpretation of the challenged powers that they 
form ‘part of a series of rules that endow the national authorities and ESMA with intervention 
powers ‘to cope with adverse developments which threaten financial stability within the 
Union’.136 
Why might this be problematic for the use of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for such 
measures? After all, established jurisprudence states that legislative measures based on Article 
114 TFEU can be aimed at preservation of the functioning of the Single Market as long as the 
measures entail a sufficient element of harmonisation. Constitutionally speaking, the problem 
boils down to the relationship between financial stability and harmonisation-lead integration. 
Traditionally, the latter promotes competition rather that stability. The financial crisis spurred 
a general debate about the relationship between financial integration and financial stability. In 
the EU financial stability is often portrayed as a companion objective with further financial 
integration. For instance, the regulation establishing the ESRB, also based on Article 114 
TFEU, explicitly states that the role of the ESRB is to contribute to financial stability 
necessary for further financial integration in the internal market.137 But even if financial 
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stability and financial integration are seemingly tightly coupled, they are not mutually 
reinforcing.138 Financial crisis threw doubt on the accepted maxim that integration of global 
financial markets automatically leads to greater financial stability.139 As financial 
globalisation has been hit by the crisis, this can actually mean that contagion problems 
diminish.140 
If more unified financial markets breed more instability, they are undoubtedly in need of more 
centralised and consolidated supervision and crisis resolution mechanisms on the EU level. 
Without such measures there is a risk that the process of market integration reverses and is 
replaced by more fragmentation and less competition.141 But basing such governance 
structures on Article 114 TFEU would need a fuller elaboration as to how these stability 
enhancing measures can be linked to approximation of the laws of the Member States. 
Handing hierarchically superior intervention powers to an EU financial agency does not seem 
to promote unification of markets, but rather prevent and contain risks that more unified 
markets are prone to create. 
CONCLUSION 
The on-going transformations in the sphere of prudential regulation of EU financial markets 
can be seen as a result of the deregulatory pressures that have dismantled the barriers to more 
integrated financial markets and finally being followed by a pressing need for EU-level 
mechanisms of prudential risk regulation.142 Indeed, it is by no means the first time the 
European Union expands its activities into new realms, despite tenuous legal base. In the past 
accommodating Treaty amendments, especially in the area of social or risk regulation, has 
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followed such movements.143 On the other hand, the on-going developments could also be 
symptomatic of a more fundamental constitutional mutation launched by the financial crisis, 
with financial stability, as rooted in the ‘Maastricht macroeconomic constitution’, 
transforming itself into a new overriding objective.144 Time will tell if future Treaty 
developments will give the nascent EU structures of prudential regulation of financial markets 
a firmer legal basis. Until that, the judgement by the Court of Justice in Short selling provides 
interim relief.  
In Short selling the Court bridged a pervasive constitutional gap in EU executive rule-making. 
The step was arguably brave: with the help of the enhanced judicial review mechanisms of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Court presumed that there exists a possibility to vest hierarchically 
superior executive power in an EU agency. For this reason, Meroni principles will serve an 
important function in filling another constitutional gap that is becoming more visible by the 
day, that is, the lack of consistency in safeguards against executive rule-making that takes 
place beyond the hierarchy of norms set up by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Short selling also reveals the creeping shadow of hierarchy that is being casted upon national 
financial supervisors. Ferran considers it a ‘safe bet’ that ESAs will follow in their 
predecessors’ footsteps and accumulate more power and influence over time.145 After Short 
Selling this bet seems safer still, perhaps with the exception of EBA that undoubtedly will 
have to do some turf searching in the shadow of the ECB’s expanding mandate. 
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